Insights
Why affiliate diversification matters in iGaming: 20 brands, 1 partner
Affiliate diversification matters in iGaming because revenue-share income concentrates in ways a brand list hides. In our 96-day ledger, 20 casino brands paid out, but 93.0% of earnings came from brands owned by one operator group, one player produced 18.7%, and players acquired this year produced 1.2%. Diversification is measured in independent counterparties, players and cohorts.

Most diversification advice counts operators and channels. This page measures concentration on a live revenue-share account instead: one affiliate programme, 304 players, 20 brands and 63 tracked campaigns over 25 June to 28 September 2026. All figures are shares of earnings; no player, deposit or payout amounts are published.
Why does affiliate diversification matter in iGaming?
Because iGaming affiliate income has four separate single points of failure, and adding more of one does not protect against the others:
- The counterparty. The programme that tracks and pays you. It can change commission terms, deductions, tracking or market access for every brand it carries at once.
- The player. On revenue share, commission is a percentage of what referred players lose. A handful of high-value players can dominate income, and one large win can erase days of it.
- The acquisition cohort. Revenue-share income in any month is mostly earned by players acquired years earlier. If acquisition stops, income decays with the old cohort.
- The traffic source. A search ranking, an app listing or an ad account that delivers most new players.
Counterparty risk is not hypothetical. In late 2017, iGaming Business reported that a major betting operator had closed its affiliate programme and another had placed affiliates on “final warning”. Contract clauses add a second layer: under negative carryover, a period that closes below zero is carried forward and set against future earnings, as Blask explains.
How many independent partners do 20 brands actually represent?
Fewer than the brand count suggests. Our ledger shows earnings from 20 brands. Ranked by share of 96-day earnings:
| Brand | Share of earnings | Players in window |
|---|---|---|
| Jackpot City | 49.8% | 134 |
| Spin Casino | 19.1% | 28 |
| Ruby Fortune | 5.4% | 23 |
| Gaming Club | 4.8% | 4 |
| Mummys Gold | 4.5% | 7 |
| Royal Vegas | 4.5% | 28 |
| 7 Sultans | 3.3% | 2 |
| Other 13 brands | 8.6% | 78 |
The top brand alone is 49.8% of earnings, and the top two are 68.9%. But the brand view still overstates independence. Jackpot City, Royal Vegas, Ruby Fortune and Spin Casino are all owned by Super Group subsidiary Cadtree Limited, and Super Group’s own brand list also includes Gaming Club, Mummy’s Gold and Lucky Nugget. Brands listed by that one group account for 93.0% of the ledger’s earnings, and all 20 brands are paid through a single affiliate programme.
In counterparty terms this ledger is one partner, not 20. A change to that programme’s terms or tracking, or a market exit, reaches every row at once. Its four Ontario-licensed brand variants together produced 2.4% of earnings, so separate licences did not split the exposure either.
How can you measure affiliate concentration risk?
Use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the measure competition regulators use for market concentration. The U.S. Department of Justice describes it as squaring each firm’s percentage share and summing the results. Markets above 1,800 are classed as highly concentrated.
Applied to an affiliate book, each source’s share of earnings replaces market share:
- By brand, our ledger scores 2,966, well above the 1,800 line.
- Dividing 10,000 by the HHI gives the equivalent number of equal-sized sources: about 3.4 brands, not 20.
- By programme, it is 10,000, the maximum, because one programme pays every brand.
The same calculation works for campaigns or traffic sources. Our 63 campaigns look spread out, but the top campaign produced 35.5% of earnings and the top five produced 66.0%. Seven of the 63 closed the window net negative.
Run the HHI at the level where a single decision can cut income: the programme or operator group for contract risk, the traffic source for acquisition risk. A brand-level HHI flatters a book whose brands share an owner.
How concentrated is revenue-share income at the player level?
More than at any other level. Over 96 days:
| Player group | Share of earnings |
|---|---|
| Largest single player | 18.7% |
| Top 5 players | 41.8% |
| Top 10% of players (30) | 85.7% |
| 61 net-negative players | -8.9% |
The largest player’s share of each month’s earnings moved between 10.9% and 26.6%. The two largest players, together 30.4% of earnings, both first deposited in 2021 or 2022 and both came through the same legacy campaign. Inside Jackpot City, the biggest brand, one player produced 37.5% of that brand’s earnings and three players produced 53.6%.
Player concentration also drives volatility. Thirteen of the 96 days closed net negative. The worst day wiped out 6.9% of the 96-day total, and 102.5% of that day’s loss came from one player’s result: every other player combined was slightly positive.
Adding operators does not fix this. A book with 30 high-value players stays fragile whether those players sit with one brand or ten. Some programmes cap the damage contractually: Blask cites terms where a single player’s negative contribution above €5,000 in a month is excluded and not carried forward. That is a clause worth negotiating, and a form of diversification that happens in the contract, not the traffic mix.
Why does acquisition timing matter as much as partner mix?
Because revenue-share income in any window belongs to old cohorts. Grouping our 304 players by the year they first deposited:
| First-deposit year | Players | Share of window earnings |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 or earlier | 92 | 30.7% |
| 2021–2022 | 60 | 47.2% |
| 2023–2025 | 107 | 20.9% |
| 2026 | 45 | 1.2% |
The 45 players acquired in 2026 are 15% of the active players but produced 1.2% of earnings. The 60 players from 2021 and 2022 produced 47.2%. This is normal for revenue share: new players have not yet had time to generate much net revenue. The risk is that today’s income can look healthy while acquisition has stalled. A gap in acquisition shows up in revenue years later, when it is too late to fix quickly.
Diversifying across time means acquiring steadily, not in bursts, and tracking income by cohort so that a shrinking pipeline is visible before the old cohort decays. Hybrid deals, which pay a fixed amount at the first deposit plus a revenue share, reduce the lag because part of each new player’s value is paid upfront.
What does a diversified iGaming affiliate book look like?
One where no single decision, player or source can remove a large share of income. Practical checks, in order of impact:
- Count counterparties, not brands. Map every brand to its owner and to the programme that pays it. Two programmes owned by different groups are more independent than ten brands under one.
- Compute HHI by programme and by traffic source. Anything above 1,800 is concentrated. Recalculate quarterly.
- Track the top-player share. If one player is more than 10% of earnings, a single win or a single account closure is a material event. Our book sits at 18.7%.
- Negotiate player-level caps and carryover terms. A per-player cap on negative revenue limits single-player damage. Check whether negative balances carry forward.
- Report income by acquisition cohort. Watch the share from players acquired in the last 12 months, not just the monthly total.
- Split traffic sources. Our top campaign was 35.5% of earnings. Losing the source behind it would take a third of income with it.
Diversification across verticals (casino, sportsbook, poker) and markets also helps, but only when the new sources sit with independent owners and programmes. See our guides to managing a multi-brand portfolio and what CPA means in affiliate marketing for the commission side.
Key takeaways
| Point | Details |
|---|---|
| Brands are not counterparties | 20 brands paid out, but 93.0% of earnings came from brands listed by one operator group, all through one programme |
| Measure with HHI | Brand-level HHI of 2,966 is above the 1,800 “highly concentrated” line and equals about 3.4 equal brands |
| Players are the sharpest risk | Top player 18.7%, top five 41.8%, top 10% of players 85.7% of earnings |
| One player can set the day | The worst day erased 6.9% of 96-day earnings, 102.5% of it from one player |
| Old cohorts carry the income | Players first depositing in 2021–2022 produced 47.2%; 2026 players produced 1.2% |
Method
Data is the daily per-player revenue-share feed for one affiliate account, 25 June to 28 September 2026: 96 complete days (29 September was excluded as a partial day), 8,252 player-day rows, 304 players, 20 brands and 63 campaigns, all casino product and all revenue share. Shares are each group’s summed earnings divided by total earnings for the window, so negative-earning groups reduce the total. Operator-group ownership was taken from Super Group’s published brand list and iGaming Business’s report on the group’s Ontario licences; brands not listed there were not counted toward the 93.0%. HHI uses percentage shares by brand, with Ontario and Alberta variants counted as separate brands, as the feed reports them. The ledger covers one programme only and is not our whole business.
FAQ
What is affiliate diversification in iGaming?
It is spreading affiliate income across independent counterparties, traffic sources, player cohorts and commission models, so that no single contract, player or channel can remove a large share of revenue. The unit that matters is the independent counterparty, not the brand: many casino brands share one owner and one affiliate programme.
Does promoting many casino brands mean an affiliate is diversified?
Not necessarily. In our 96-day ledger, 20 brands generated earnings, but 93.0% came from brands listed by one operator group, Super Group, and all 20 were paid through one programme. A programme-level change to terms, tracking or market access would hit all of them at once.
How can an affiliate measure concentration risk?
Square each source’s percentage share of earnings and sum the results: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The U.S. Department of Justice treats markets above 1,800 as highly concentrated. Our ledger scores 2,966 by brand, which behaves like about 3.4 equal-sized brands rather than 20.
Can one player really move an affiliate’s revenue-share income?
Yes. In our ledger the single largest player produced 18.7% of 96 days of earnings, the top five produced 41.8%, and the worst day erased 6.9% of the period’s total, almost entirely because of one player’s win.
Does adding new operators fix player concentration?
No. Player concentration comes from a small number of high-value players, and it only dilutes as more players are acquired over time. Players who first deposited in 2026 produced 1.2% of window earnings, while 60 players from 2021 to 2022 produced 47.2%.
Recommended
Frequently asked
Quick answers.
- What is affiliate diversification in iGaming?
- It is spreading affiliate income across independent counterparties, traffic sources, player cohorts and commission models, so that no single contract, player or channel can remove a large share of revenue. The unit that matters is the independent counterparty, not the brand: many casino brands share one owner and one affiliate programme.
- Does promoting many casino brands mean an affiliate is diversified?
- Not necessarily. In our 96-day ledger, 20 brands generated earnings, but 93.0% came from brands listed by one operator group, Super Group, and all 20 were paid through one programme. A programme-level change to terms, tracking or market access would hit all of them at once.
- How can an affiliate measure concentration risk?
- Square each source's percentage share of earnings and sum the results: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The U.S. Department of Justice treats markets above 1,800 as highly concentrated. Our ledger scores 2,966 by brand, which behaves like about 3.4 equal-sized brands rather than 20.
- Can one player really move an affiliate's revenue-share income?
- Yes. In our ledger the single largest player produced 18.7% of 96 days of earnings, the top five produced 41.8%, and the worst day erased 6.9% of the period's total, almost entirely because of one player's win.
- Does adding new operators fix player concentration?
- No. Player concentration comes from a small number of high-value players, and it only dilutes as more players are acquired over time. Players who first deposited in 2026 produced 1.2% of window earnings, while 60 players from 2021 to 2022 produced 47.2%.
Sources
- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index — U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division — www.justice.gov
- Super Group casino brands including Spin approved for Ontario launch — iGaming Business — igamingbusiness.com
- Brands — Super Group (SGHC) Ltd — supergroup.com
- Negative carryover in iGaming: NCO vs NNCO — Blask — blask.com
- The beginning of the end for affiliation as we know it? — iGaming Business — igamingbusiness.com